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Abstract
The paper analyzes the interaction between a reliable source of electricity
production and intermittent sources such as wind or solar power. We first
characterize the first-best dispatch and investment in the two types of energy.
We put the accent on the availability of the intermittent source as a major
parameter of optimal capacity investment. We then analyze decentralization
through competitive market mechanisms. We show that decentralizing first-
best requires to price electricity contingently on wind or solar availability. By
contrast, traditional meters impose a second-best uniform pricing, which dis-
torts the optimal mix of energy sources. Decentralizing the second-best requires
either cross-subsidy from the intermittent source to the reliable source of energy
or structural integration of the two types of technology.
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1 Introduction
The substitution of renewable sources of energy such as wind and photovoltaic power
for fossil fuel in electricity production is one of the key technological solutions to mit-
igate global warming. It is currently pushed forward by many scientists and policy
makers in the debate on greenhouse gas emission reduction. It has led to environ-
mental policies to support less-carbon intensive renewable sources of energy such as
subsidies, feed-in tariffs and mandatory minimal installed capacity. In all developed
countries, the generation of electricity from geothermal, wind, solar and other re-
newables increases by more than 20% a year. Nevertheless there is a large difference
between OECD Europe where renewables count for 6% of electricity generation and
OECD North America where the ratio is 2.5%.1 The difference mainly comes from
the policy of the European Commission. It has fixed a minimum target of a 20 %
share of energy from renewable sources in the overall energy mix for 2020. If all
Member States could achieve their national targets fixed in 2001, 21 % of overall
electricity consumption in the EU would be produced from renewable energy sources
by 2010.2
An essential feature of most renewable sources of energy is intermittency. Electric-
ity can be produced from wind turbines only during windy days, from photovoltaic
cells during sunny days and certainly not during the night, from waves and swell
when the sea is rough. All these intermittent sources of energy rely on an input
(wind, sun, waves, tide) whose supply depends on out-of-control conditions. Some of
these conditions are perfectly predictable, for example the seasonal duration of day
period for sun power or the tide level. Others like wind and sunshine intensity can
only be forecasted few days in advance although with some degree of uncertainty.
By contrast, a particular feature of the electricity industry is the commitment
1OECD/IEA (2010), Monthly Electric Statistics, November 2009; available at
www.iea.org/stats/surveys/mes.pdf
2“Renewable Energy Road Map. Renewable energies in the 21st century: building a more sus-
tainable future"; available at europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l27065.htm.
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of retailers to supply electricity to consumers at a given price anytime for any level
of demand. This business model reflects the consumers’ taste for a reliable source
of energy viewed as essential, for example for lightning, cooling or heating. Black-
outs being very costly, electricity production and supply are designed to match the
demand of consumers any time at any location on the grid. Clearly, the variability
and unpredictability of intermittent sources of energy conflict with the reliable supply
of electricity.
One way to reconcile intermittent supply with permanent demand consists in
storing the input, the output or both. To that respect hydropower production is an
attractive source of energy. Although it relies on uncertain rainfall and snow, water
can be stored in reservoirs to supply peak load with electricity. In particular, in
northern countries, water is stored in fall and spring to be used in winter for heating
and lightening. By contrast input storage is not possible for the growing sources of
renewables, wind and sun power. As regards output storage, it is also very limited.
The current storage technologies through batteries are very costly and inefficient so
far. An intermediary solution in combination with hydropower is pumped storage.3
The introduction of a significative share of intermittent and non storable source of
energy is a new challenge for the operators and regulators of the electricity industry.
On top of difficulties for the transport and distribution grid, intermittent sources
raise problems at the generation stage. In this paper we are mainly interested in
three of them. The first one is the efficient mix of intermittent sources (wind, so-
lar,...) and reliable sources such as fossil fuel (coal, oil, natural gas) or nuclear power.
The second issue is the compatibility of intermittent sources of energy with market
mechanisms. Specifically, do competitive markets allow to decentralize the efficient
mix of capacity? The third one is the design of an environmental policy aimed at
promoting low carbon technologies by relying on intermittent sources of energy and
simultaneously guaranteeing security of supply.
3Cheap electricity is used at periods of low demand to restore water resources that can be used
to generate electricity at periods of peak demand. See Crampes and Moreaux (2010).
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To address those issues, we rely on a stylized model of energy investment and pro-
duction with two sources of energy: an intermittent and non-storable one, say wind,
and a reliable one, say fossil fuel. The two sources differ in cost and in availability.
Of course, both sources require installed capacities at a cost. Electricity generation
in plants using non intermittent energy costs the price of fossil fuel plus a possible
polluting emission tax or price. By contrast, producing electricity from wind is (al-
most) free once capacity is installed. Nevertheless, it is possible only in the "states of
nature" where the input (wind) is available. We characterize the efficient energy mix
in installed capacity and production depending on costs. We show that, depending
on the cost of operating the reliable source, i.e. the cost of fuel plus pollution permits,
wind power is used either as a substitute or a complement with fuel power during
windy days. We also show the economic findings remain unchanged when we consider
the case of several sources of intermittent energy, e.g. wind turbines at two different
locations with unequal weather conditions. We determine under which conditions it
is efficient to invest in both sources of intermittent energy even if one is more efficient
at producing MWh.
Next, we show that decentralizing the efficient energy mix requires to set prices
contingent on the availability of the intermittent source of energy, that is on weather
conditions. Imposing the same price in all states of nature (either wind turbines are
spinning or not) leads to a second-best with under-investment in wind power and
over-investment in fossil fuel. The reason is that a uniform price does not reflect
energy scarcity in each state of nature. The price is too high during windy days when
energy is abundant and too low during windless days when energy is scarce. Wind
power production is thus more profitable than fossil power. As a consequence, a
regulated electricity monopoly that operates the two technologies under a zero profit
condition experiences a deficit on fossil power which is financed by the profit from its
wind power division. If, by contrast, electricity is supplied by competing firms owning
one of the two technologies, the zero profit condition of the fossil power producers
implies strictly positive profits for wind power producers. We then provide policy
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insights for efficiency improvement and climate change mitigation.
The paper is not the first to address the efficient energy mix with renewable and
non-renewable sources of energy, its compatibility with market mechanisms and the
related public policies. Notably, Fischer and Newell (2008) assess different environ-
mental policies to mitigate climate change with the two sources of energy including
wind power. However, their focus is on innovation and technological improvement
of both technologies. They abstract from wind power intermittency by assuming a
reliable annual output with wind power. Other papers focus on the storage of en-
ergy in reservoirs for hydropower. They examine competition among hydropower
plants (Garcia et al., 2001, Ambec and Doucet, 2002) or between a hydropower and a
thermal producer (Crampes and Moreaux, 2001). However, all these papers consider
deterministic supply of renewable inputs whereas here we focus on input variability.
The economics of intermittent sources of electricity production are still in their
infancy. Most papers on the subject are empirical and country specific. For exam-
ple, Neuhoff et al. (2006 and 2007) develop a linear programming model to capture
the effects of the regional variation of wind output on investment planning and on
dispatching in the UK when transport is constrained. Kennedy (2005) estimates the
social benefit of large-scale wind power production (taking into account the environ-
mental benefits) and applies it to the development of this technology in the South of
Long Island. Boccard (2008) computes the social cost of wind power as the difference
between its actual cost and the cost of replacing the produced energy. He divides
the social cost into technological and adequacy components and applies the break-up
to Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Müsgens and Neuhoff
(2006) build an engineering model representing inter-temporal constraints in electric-
ity generation with uncertain wind output. They provide numerical results for the
German power system. Coulomb and Neuhoff (2005) focus on the cost of wind tur-
bines in relation with changes in their size using data on German prices. Papers like
Butler and Neuhoff (2004) and Menanteau et al. (2003) are closer to ours than the
former ones. They consider the variety of tools available for public intervention in the
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development of renewable energy in general, and intermittent sources in particular.4
Our analysis is upstream the latter papers as it provides a microeconomic framework
for the study of optimal investment and dispatching of wind or solar plants. It also
allows to determine by how much market mechanisms depart from the outcome of
optimal decisions. Garcia and Alzate (2010) compare the performance of two public
policies: feed-in tariffs and mandatory portfolio standards. They also examine the
efficient energy mix but with an inelastic demand which is nil beyond a maximal
price. Their model cannot capture the social cost of rationing demand. By contrast
we consider a standard increasing and concave consumer’s surplus function (or util-
ity for electricity consumption) which leads to a more general demand decreasing in
price. Our framework allows to better assess the social impact of energy produc-
tion on consumers. Moreover, it is a more realistic assumption to analyze long run
decisions concerning investment in generation capacity.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model with the two
sources of energy (reliable and intermittent) and determines the first-best dispatch
and generation capacities. Section 3 analyzes the decentralization of first-best with
state-contingent prices and second-best with uniform prices. In section 4 we extend
the model to two different sources of intermittent energy. Section 5 discusses two
policy insights based on our main results, namely the development of smart tech-
nologies necessary for the implementation of first best and the structural or financial
links between technologies necessary to the implementation of second-best. Section
6 concludes.
4All these papers are devoted to wind power. Borenstein (2008) proposes a deep economic
analysis of solar photovoltaic electricity production with a focus on California.
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2 First best production
We consider an industry where consumers derive gross utility S(q) from the consump-
tion of q kWh of electricity. This function is unchanged along the period considered.5
It is a continuous derivable function with S0 > 0 and S00 < 0.
Electricity can be produced by means of two technologies. First a fully controlled
technology (e.g. coal, oil, gas, nuclear, hydropower with water storage) allows to
produce qf at unit cost6 c as long as production does not exceed the installed capacity,
Kf . The unit cost of capacity is rf . This source of electricity will be named the "fossil"
source. We assume S0(0) > c+ rf ; in words, producing electricity from fossil energy
is efficient when it is the only source.
The second technology relies on an intermittent source of energy such as solar
energy or wind. It allows to produce qi kWh at 0 cost as long as qi is smaller than the
installed capacity Ki, whose unit cost is ri and the primary energy is available. We
assume two states of nature: “with" and “without" intermittent energy. The state
of nature with (respectively without) intermittent energy occurs with probability ν
(respectively 1− ν) and is denoted by the superscript w (respectively w).
For simplicity, we abstract from environmental issues related to electricity pro-
duction by assuming that c, rf and ri include the environmental marginal costs to
society. More specifically, burning fossil fuel to produce qf KWh requires to buy
carbon emission permits or to pay a carbon tax. We assume that they are part
of the marginal cost c and they reflect the marginal damage due to climate change
by one KWh produced from fossil energy once capacity has been installed. Thanks
to this assumption it is not unrealistic to consider the case of wind or solar power
technologies being more competitive than thermal plants. Therefore, we will take all
5The problem we have in mind better corresponds to wind than to solar energy. Indeed, demand
is changing along the daily cycle so that there is some positive correlation between demand for
electricity and the supply of solar energy. This correlation does not hold as regards wind. And there
is no reason for a negative correlation either.
6The unit cost includes the tax on polluting emissions or the price of emission permits, if any.
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combinations of cost parameters into consideration.
The first-best problem to solve is twofold. First, the central planner determines
the capacities Ki, Kf to install. This is the long run commitment of the decision
process. Second, it chooses how to dispatch the capacities in each state of nature qwi ,
qwf and q
w
i , qwf , depending on the availability of the intermittent source. It is a short
run decision constrained by the installed capacities. When deciding on the dispatch
of plants, the planner knows the state of nature.
Although the problem a priori counts six decision variables, three can be easily
determined, leaving us with only three unknowns to be determined. Actually,
i. qwi ≡ 0: windmills cannot produce if there is no wind and solar batteries
cannot produce absent any sun ray;
ii. qwi ≡ Ki: since the installation of the capacity for producing with the
intermittent source is costly, it would be inefficient to install idle capacity.7
iii. qwf = Kf : without intermittent source of energy, since demand is un-
changed and the available capacity is reduced from Kf + Ki to Kf , it would be
inefficient to leave idle some production capacity.8
For the three remaining decision variables Ki, Kf and qwf , the planner’s program
can be written as follows:9
(P1) max
Ki,Kf
ν
∙
max
qwf
S(Ki + qwf )− cqwf
¸
+ (1− ν)[S(Kf)− cKf ]− rfKf − riKi
s.t. qwf ≥ 0 , qwf ≤ Kf , Ki ≥ 0
As proven in the Appendix, we can establish the following:
7We discard the necessary maintenance operations, for example assuming that they can be per-
formed during type w periods.
8Here again, we discard maintenance operations, for example by assuming that capacity is mea-
sured in terms of available plants.
9Note that it is not necessary to write explicitly the constraint Kf ≥ 0 because Kf > 0 is granted
by the assumption S0(0) > c+ rf .
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Proposition 1 First best capacities and outputs are such that
a) for riν > c+ rf
qwf = q
w
f = Kf = S
0−1(c+ rf), qwi = Ki = 0
b) for c > riν
qwf = 0 < q
w
f = Kf = S
0−1 ¡c+ rf
1−ν
¢
< qwi = Ki = S
0−1 ¡ri
ν
¢
c) for c+ rf > riν > c
qwf = q
w
f = Kf = S
0−1
³
c+rf−ri
1−ν
´
, qwi = Ki = S
0−1 ¡ri
ν
¢
− S 0−1
³
c+rf−ri
1−ν
´
In case a) the intermittent energy is so scarce (small ν) and/or the technology
using this energy is so costly (high ri) that no plant using intermittent energy should
be installed. Then whatever the state of nature, the fossil plant is used at full capacity.
The capacity is determined by the equality between the marginal utility of electricity
and its long run marginal cost c + rf . In case b) wind is so abundant and wind
turbines so cheap that the intermittent energy totally replaces fossil energy in state
of nature w. The capacity to install equates the unit cost of capacity ri discounted
by the probability of availability ν to marginal utility. Fossil energy capacity is only
used in state of nature w. Its long run marginal cost is c plus the capacity cost rf
discounted by the probability of using it 1 − ν since it is dispatched only when the
intermittent source is not available.
In the intermediary case c), fossil energy is used at full capacity jointly with
intermittent energy. This case is illustrated in Figure 1. The merit order in state
of nature w just consists in dispatching fossil energy up to Kf determined by the
equality between marginal utility and long run marginal cost. The latter is equal
to the cost of the marginal technology in state w that is c+rf
1−ν reduced by the saving
on the cost of developing the other technology. This is because, at periods w, f is
the marginal technology to dispatch (since c > 0) but i is the one to develop (since
ri
ν < c + rf). Then
ri
ν is the long run marginal cost of the whole system and it
determines the total capacity to install Ki +Kf by S0(Ki +Kf) = riν .
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Figure 1: First best when the two technologies are used
in state of nature w
Figure 2 allows to understand how the two capacitiesKf andKi must be combined
at first best. We have depicted Ki ,Kf and the sum Ki +Kf as functions of ri. The
graph clearly shows that when the intermittent technology i becomes profitable (that
is when riν ≤ c+rf) it is not simply substituted for fossil energy f . As ri decreases, it
is true that there occurs some substitution since Kf decreases but the total capacity
Kf +Ki increases. Substitution cannot be done on a one-to-one basis since nothing
can be produced with technology i in state of nature w. Nevertheless there is some
substitution with the consequence that, as compared with a world without technology
i, there is less energy available in state of nature w than in state w.
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Figure 2: Capacities as functions of the development cost of type-i
technology with varying prices
3 Decentralization
Regulation authorities in most developped countries promote simultaneously renew-
able sources for electricity production and the liberalization of the industry. To assess
the consequences of these separate policies, we now consider the decentralization of
first best by market mechanisms taking account of the reactivity of consumers to
price variations (Section 3.1), then on the contrary their lack of reactivity (Section
3.2).
3.1 Market implementation with reactive consumers
Assume that consumers and firms are price-takers. Suppose also that they are
equipped to be price sensitive. It is easy to show that the optimal outcome can
be decentralized with prices contingent on states of nature pw and pw. In practice,
it means that electricity prices should depend on the presence or the absence of the
intermittent source of energy.
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In each state of nature s ∈ {w,w}, consumers facing price ps solve maxq S(qs)−
psq. They demand qs kWh in state s where S0(qs) = ps (marginal utility equals price)
for s = w,w.
First consider case a) whereby riν > c + rf . The prices that decentralize the
optimal outcome are pw = pw = c+ rf . Consumers react to that prices by consuming
the efficient productions qw = qw = S0−1(c+ rf). Producers owning the intermittent
technology i invest nothing since the long term marginal cost ri of each kWh exceeds
the expected unit benefit pwν. Producers endowed with the fossil technology f invest
up to supply all consumers Kf = qw = qw. Since the long run marginal cost of each
kWh c + rf equals the market price in both states of nature pw = pw, they make
zero profit. Clearly, the prices that decentralize first-best are unique. With lower
prices, fossil electricity producers would not recoup their investment and thus would
invest nothing. Symmetrically, with higher prices, more fossil fuel capacities would
be installed and competitive entry would reduce prices to the long term marginal
cost.
Second, in case b) where c > riν , the prices that decentralize first best are p
w = riν
and pw = c+ rf
1−ν per kWh. As before, consumers react to those prices by consuming
qw = S0−1( riν ) in state of nature w and q
w = S0−1(c + rf
1−ν ) in state w. In state
w, firms producing energy from fossil sources cannot compete with those producing
from intermittent sources. They therefore specialize in producing only during state of
nature w. Their expected return on each unit of capacity is thus (1− ν)(pw−c) = rf .
Since it exactly balances the marginal cost of capacities, the plants using fossil source
have a zero expected profit. Similarly, firms with intermittent technology obtain an
expected return νpw = ri per unit of investment and thus zero profit on average. In
other words, under those prices, each type of producer recoups exactly its long term
marginal cost, taking into account the probability of using capacities.
Third, in case c) whereby c + rf > riν > c, with prices p
w = riν and p
w =
c+rf−ri
1−ν the market quantities also are at first-best levels. Consumers’ demand is
qwf = S
0−1( c+rf−ri
1−ν ) when the wind is not blowing and q
w
f + q
w
i = S0−1(
ri
ν ) when it
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is. In state w, competing producers are ordered on the basis of their bids which are
equal to short run marginal cost under perfect competition, that is 0 for i-producers
and c for f -producers. The investment in capacity depends on expected returns and
long run marginal costs. Fossil electricity firms produce in both states of nature.
The return per unit of capacity is thus νpw + (1 − ν)pw − c which matches exactly
the capacity unit cost rf . Thus f-producers make zero profit. On the other hand, i
producers get in expectation νpw per unit of investment which also matches exactly
the cost ri. They therefore make zero profit as well which is the equilibrium under
free entry condition. Therefore, we have established the following.
Proposition 2 State contingent prices pw and pw¯ with pw¯ ≥ pw and free entry allow
market mechanisms to reach first best. When it is efficient to install intermittent
sources of energy, pw¯ > pw.
3.2 Market implementation with non-reactive consumers
The decentralization process described in the former section faces a serious hurdle.
The first best dispatch and investment can be driven with state contingent prices
only if consumers have smart meters signaling scarcity values and if they are able to
adapt to price signals. Actually, most consumers, particularly among households, are
equipped with traditional meters. Consequently they are billed at a price independent
of the state of nature.
To assess the consequences of a uniform pricing constraint, we determine the
efficient production and investment levels constrained by uniform delivery. Actually,
with a stationary surplus function as assumed here, consumers react to uniform prices
by consuming the same amount of electricity in both states of nature. Formally,
non state contingent pricing implies the constraint qwi + qwf = q
w
f . Yet, since the
intermittent (resp. reliable) technology is used under full capacity in state w (resp.
w) the later constraint leads to Ki + qwf = Kf . To distinguish it from first-best, we
denote the solution of the (second-best) uniform pricing constrained program by (q˜wi ,
q˜wf , K˜i K˜f).
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As shown in the Appendix, the main consequence of this restriction is that the
intermittent source of energy will never be used in complement to fossil energy in state
w. More precisely, case c) of Proposition 1 where both technologies are operated in
state w (namely for c < riν < c + rf) disappears. This is because the constraint of
uniform provision Ki + qwf = Kf makes the two technologies perfect substitutes in
state w. It results in a bang-bang solution. If c < riν only technology f is installed
and S0(Kf) = c + rf = p˜w = p˜w. The uniform price just matches the long term
marginal cost of the f technology. On the other hand, if c > riν , both technologies are
installed but only technology i is used when possible, i.e. in state w with S0(Kf) =
S0(Ki) = (1 − ν)c + rf + ri = p˜w = p˜w. The uniform price equals the long term
marginal cost of each kWh, namely (1− ν)c + rf + ri, taking into account that the
two technologies are developed to insure uniform delivery and c is incurred only in
state w which arises with probability 1− ν. We therefore can assert the following.
Proposition 3 When prices cannot be state-contingent, second best capacities and
outputs are such that:
a) for riν > c
q˜wf = q˜
w¯
f = K˜f = S
0−1(c+ rf), q˜wi = K˜i = 0
b) for riν < c,
q˜wf = 0 < q˜
w¯
f = K˜f = q˜
w
i = K˜i = S0−1((1− ν)c+ rf + ri)
The disappearance of the possibility to jointly operate the two technologies in
state w can be illustrated using Figure 1. The fact that consumers are weakly price-
sensitive can be viewed as if their marginal surplus curve S0(q) were more vertical.10
Consequently the horizontal difference between points A and B is smaller and smaller,
which means that Ki converges to zero in this interval of cost.
10Notice that consumers are not inelastic to price since their demand (marginal utility) function
has a finite negative slope. They would change their consumption if they could receive state-
contingent price signals. But they cannot react since they receive a uniform price signal.
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Figure 3 shows how the uniform-pricing constraint transforms the capacities as
functions of the cost of renewables ri. In the left part of the graph where it is socially
profitable to invest in technology i, the two technologies become strict complements,
contrary to what we have observed in Figure 2. The consequence is that, except if
ν = 1 where K˜f = 0, the smaller ri the larger K˜f = K˜i. In words, even if the renewable
source has a very high probability of availability but cannot be totally guaranteed,
when prices are not state-contigent the whole capacity must be duplicated. Actually,
the problem is the same as for reserve capacities that must be available to replace
failing plants or to supply unexpected demand, except that in state w¯ the whole
type-i capacity is failing and must be replaced.
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Figure 3: Capacities as functions of the development cost of type-i
technology with constant prices
An important drawback of the second-best solution with a mix of the two tech-
nologies (that is when c > riν ) is that it requires some form of subsidy from technology
i to technology f to secure non-negative profits. Absent any external financial trans-
fer, second-best can be decentralized only under certain conditions, for example a
regulated electricity monopoly or competitive firms owning the two technologies.
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To prove this surprising result, we first observe that the expected unit profit of a
firm using the two technologies is nil since
νp˜w − ri + (1− ν)(p˜w − c)− rf = 0
Thus the division operating technology i obtains positive cash flows
νp˜w − ri = ν
h
(1− ν)(c− ri
ν
) + rf
i
> 0
whereas the fossil energy division incurs financial losses (1−ν)(p˜w−c)−rf < 0. These
losses are obviously larger and larger when ν increases since i) the price decreases,
ii) the type-f technology is less often called into operation and iii) the capacity to
install increases. This can result in huge financial resources so that transfers from
division i towards division f are necessary to sustain second-best.
What occurs when the two technologies are owned by separate operators and
transfers are not allowed? In a competitive industry with free-entry, the fossil energy-
based electricity producers will exit the market under the second-best electricity price.
This will reduce the supply of energy in state w and, therefore, increase the price
of electricity in both states of nature above the second best level. The free entry
equilibrium price in a competitive industry with a unique price in the two states of
nature is such that firms with fossil technology make zero profit. It thus matches the
fossil energy producer’s long term marginal cost c+ rf . The firms with intermittent
energy technology i enjoy strictly positive profits. They free-ride on the uniform price
constraint.
Finally, note that since pw = c + rf
1−ν > p˜
w = p˜w > pw = riν , and prices signal
investment opportunities, the capacity of intermittent energy installed under uniform
price is smaller than at first-best whereas the opposite stands for fossil energy, i.e.
K˜i < Ki and K˜f > Kf . This is true when K˜i = K˜f , that is when riν < c, but it is
also obviously true when c < riν < c+ rf since K˜i = 0 < Ki and K˜f < Kf +Ki.
We therefore can assert the following:
Proposition 4 When the price of electricity cannot be state contingent, second best
is implementable only if the two sources of energy are owned by the same financial
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entity or if the government transfers revenues from intermittent sources to reliable
sources. Otherwise, free entry with uniform price leads to (i) over-investment and zero
profits in fossil fuel electricity production; (ii) under-investment and strictly positive
profits in the intermittent source industry.
To summarize, this section the decentralization of first-best production levels of
electricity calls for a lower price when intermittent sources of energy are available.
If not feasible for technological or institutional reasons, the second-best production
levels under the uniform pricing constraint distort first-best prices by increasing the
price of intermittent energy pw and reducing the price of fossil energy when inter-
mittent energy in not available pw. Intermittent energy is therefore overvalued and
fossil-fuel electricity undervalued compared to first-best. It thus leads to under-
investment into intermittent energy and over-investment into fossil fuel electricity.
In a nutshell, since a uniform price does not reflect state-of-nature marginal costs,
consumers tend to over-consume electricity when it is costly to produce (in state w)
and under-consume it when it is cheap (in state w). Compared to first-best, this
increases demand for fossil energy and reduces it for intermittent energy. Long run
supply through investment in capacities is adapted accordingly.
4 Two sources of intermittent energy
The former results can be easily generalized to cases where several sources of inter-
mittent energy are available. Assume there are two sources, labelled 1 and 2. The
two sources can be of different kind, e.g. wind and solar. They also can be of the
same kind but at different locations e.g. turbines facing different wind conditions. As
a consequence, the two sources differ potentially both in their occurrence and in the
energy produced when available. For instance, they might face different dominant
winds (north versus south), one being stronger on average than the other.
The results of the former sections can be extended to the multiplicity of sources
by increasing the number of states of nature. For example, with two turbines located
17
at different places, we have four states of nature: in state 1 only the intermittent
source of energy 1 is available, in state 2 only the intermittent source of energy 2 is
available, in state 12 both are available and, as before, in state w none is available (and
therefore electricity can only be produced from fossil energy). These states of nature
occur with probabilities ν1, ν2, ν12 and 1 − ν respectively where ν = ν1 + ν2 + ν12.
Let us denote by Ki the investment into intermittent source of energy i for i = 1, 2.
The unit cost of capacity of source i is denoted ri > 0 for i = 1, 2 where r2 > r1. For
instance, if wind turbines are at different locations and the mean wind is stronger11
at location 1 than at 2 when it is windy, then with a smaller number of wind turbines
at location 1 one can produce the same amount of electricity at location 1 and at
location 2. Yet, the occurrence of the two sources of intermittent energy might make
location 2 attractive.
The planner must determine the capacity of the two intermittent sources of energy
K1 and K2 in addition to the fossil source Kf and the production levels qsf , q
s
1 and qs2
in states s = w, 1, 2 and 12. Using notations similar to the former section’s, we can
easily determine that for i = 1, 2, qwi ≡ 0, qsi = Ki in states s = 1, 2, 12 and qwf = Kf .
The remaining decision variablesK1, K2,Kf , q1f , q
2
f and q
12
f are determined by solving
program (P2) below:
(P2) max
K1,K2,Kf
ν1max
q1f
£
S(K1 + q1f)− cq1f
¤
+ ν2max
q2f
£
S(K2 + q2f)− cq2f
¤
+ν12max
q12f
£
S(K1 +K2 + q12f )− cq12f
¤
+ (1− ν)[S(Kf)− cKf ]
−rfKf − r1K1 − r2K2
subject to
0 ≤ qsf ≤ Kf for s = 1, 2, 12; Ki ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2.
Depending on the cost parameters and the probability of each state of nature we
can obtain a large spectrum of results, some with only one intermittent source of
11Nevertheless the wind should not be "too strong" because windmills could not resist.
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energy to operate, others combining the two sources. In each case we can derive the
capacity to install and the dispatch that maximize net social welfare. Using the proof
in the appendix, we just establish the following proposition.
Proposition 5 First best capacities in the intermittent sources of energy 1 and 2 are
such that
a) For ν1 > 0 and ν2 > 0, K1 = K2 = 0 if and only if c + rf < riνi + ν12 for
i = 1, 2.
b) For c+ rf > riνi + ν12
1) K1 > 0 and K2 = 0 if ν1 = ν2 = 0 and ν12 > 0,
(perfect positive correlation),
2) K1 > 0 and K2 > 0 if ν1 > 0, ν2 > 0 and ν12 = 0
(perfect negative correlation).
As in investment portfolios, the decision to invest in various intermittent technolo-
gies does not only depend on the return on investment but also on the risk associated
to each return. According to a) in Proposition 5, a necessary and sufficient condition
for investing in an intermittent source of energy is riνi + ν12 < c+rf for one i ∈ {1, 2}
at least: the long run marginal cost of electricity produced from source i discounted
by the probability of its availability νi+ν12 must be lower than the long run marginal
cost of electricity produced from fossil energy. Depending on the value of the parame-
ters, in some cases, the two sources of intermittent energy are installed and, in other
cases, only one is installed. For instance, consider the extreme cases b.1) and b.2) of
perfectly positive and negative correlations respectively. If sources 1 and 2 are always
available only at the same time (perfect positive correlation), we have ν1 = ν2 = 0.
Then only the more efficient source of intermittent energy should be installed. Even
if riν12 < c+ rf for i = 1, 2 so that the two sources of intermittent energy have lower
discounted marginal cost than fossil energy, only source 1 is installed since we have
assumed r1 < r2. On the contrary, if sources 1 and 2 are never available at the same
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time (perfect negative correlation), which translates formally into ν12 = 0, then as
long as riνi < c + rf for i = 1, 2 both sources of intermittent energy are installed. In
particular, source 2 is installed even if it is more costly (r2 > r1) and/or less frequent
(ν2 < ν1). Concretely, if wind turbines can be developed at two different locations,
one being superior in terms of wind speed and frequency, it is efficient to install tur-
bines at both locations to exploit the complementarity of the two sources of energy as
long as their discounted long run marginal costs are lower than the fossil energy cost.
Like in all portfolio management problems, negative correlation allows some form of
insurance. But as long as ν1+ ν2+ ν12 < 1, it is necessary to install reliable capacity
to replace the intermittent technologies in "bad" states of nature. This cost should
be internalized by the builders and operators of the plants using intermittent sources.
Notice that the multiplicity of locations make more costly the transmission of any
signal about which source of energy is currently generating electricity. Consequently,
our former developments about the difficulty to implement first and second best are
made even more relevant.
5 Policy insights
The model developed in the above sections analyzes cases where intermittent tech-
nologies can compete against fossil fuel technologies. This may be the case in the
future after a technological break or some drastic learning effect, or due to more
stringent climate change mitigation policies (higher carbon taxes or fewer emission
permit) leading to a higher marginal cost for fossil combustion.12 Meanwhile, inter-
mittent technologies are sustained by public aids (e.g. certificates, feed-in tariffs)
or purchase requirement that represent a financial burden for society. These costs
are well known. They are so high that at the beginning of 2010, some governments
12According to the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences (2010), the full cost for electricity gener-
ated by wind power, excluding the costs for expanding the electricity power line network and the
back-up power, is currently 6-10c€/kWh. This is slightly larger than the generation cost in coal
power plants but twice the cost in nuclear plants.
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(in particular France and Germany) have decided to step back from a blind policy
of support to photovoltaic energy. By contrast the back-up costs we have identified
with our model are less emphasized and still entail important policy implications as
regards the future of the energy industry. We first focus on the cost of adapting the
consumption electrical appliances and the network to decentralize the first best. We
then consider the structural or institutional arrangement required to decentralize the
second-best with uniform pricing.
5.1 Smart equipment and smart network
Our first-best analysis suggests that intermittent technologies should be promoted
in parallel to smart meters and/or smart boxes. These intelligent devices can make
electricity consumption dependent on the state of nature that prevails at the location
of production plants. By controlling in real time some programmed electric equip-
ments such as boilers and heaters, disconnecting them when the intermittent source
of energy is not available, smart meters and boxes renders electricity consumption
sensitive to the energy scarcity across time and space. They are likely be more re-
ceptive and reactive than consumers exposed to messages such as “the wind turbines
you are connected to are currently running; therefore the price of electricity is low"
(or the opposite). The smart meters or boxes that would dispatch automatically
consumption across time need to be connected with information technologies to be
installed in the shadow of the energy network. More generally, the growth of intermit-
tent energy calls for further investment in network, increasing both connection and
information processing. Indeed, compared to thermal power plants, wind and solar
power plants are more likely to be scattered on a given territory. This has two conse-
quences. First, connection requires large investment in small scale lines, transformers
and meters. This obviously makes coordination necessary between producers, trans-
mitters and system and market operators. Second, random local injections radically
modify the business model of distributors since they now have to balance the flows
on the grid under their responsibility and maybe to install new lines to guarantee
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the reliability of the local system under the constraint to accept all injections by au-
thorized generators. The adaptation of networks to the development of intermittent
sources has been underestimated so far. In most developed countries making the grid
smart is now a priority, which means huge investments for embedding Information
and Communication Technologies (ICT) into the grid.13
5.2 Structural arrangements
It may appear that the huge cost of installing smart appliances at consumption nodes
coupled with ICT devices all along the grid is too high compared to the difference
between first best and second best welfare levels. If so, consumers will continue
to face a single price whenever wind turbines are producing or not. Compared to
the first-best with state-contingent prices, they demand too little energy when the
intermittent source is available and too much when it is not. Were the resulting
equilibrium price an average value of the marginal costs of production in the different
types of generation plants, the generators using fossil energy would lose money. Then
they would exit the industry. We therefore have to consider several structural and
legal solutions to implement the second-best outcome. Under free entry and exit, in
order to keep generators using fossil fuel in the market, the price should be equal
to the long run marginal cost of their MWh. It is as if consumers had to pay for
a guarantee of service. The drawback of this solution is that the owners of plants
using intermittent energy pocket a benefit equal to the difference between the long
run marginal cost of electricity from fossil fuel and the long run marginal cost of
electricity from intermittent energy. Consumers pay for an insurance and the money
thay pay is seized by those who create randomness. Two public policies can reduce
the rent assigned to intermittent energy producers. A first one consists in taxing
windmills to subsidize thermal plants in order to balance the budget of all producers.
A second one is mandatory technological mix or insurance. Each producer should
13See for example the website www.smartgrids.eu.
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either control the two technologies or buy an insurance contract that guarantees
energy supply any time. These legal arrangements would force any new entrant to
insure production in all states of nature. Both policies have their drawbacks. The
first one, more “market-based”, is at a cost of levying and redistributing public funds.
The second one, more “command-and-control", restricts the firms’ flexibility in their
technological choices.
6 Conclusion
The development of intermittent sources of energy to produce electricity creates a se-
ries of difficulties as regards the adaptation of behavior, structures and institutions to
the characteristics of these sources. Satisfying the demand for non contingent electric-
ity at a non contingent price clearly requires an installed capacity of non intermittent
sources equal to the capacity of intermittent source, whatever the availability dura-
tion of the intermittent source. Actually, because availability periods are not known
with certainty and fossil fuel plants cannot be dispatched instantaneously when it is
necessary to replace intermittent sources, the back-up capacity must even be larger.
In Ireland for example, "incorporating 30GW of additional renewable capacity into
the grid, to meet EU’s 2020 target, will require a further 14-19GW of new fossil fuel
and nuclear capacity to replace plants due to close and to meet new demand (almost
doubling the total new installed electricity generating capacity required by 2020, com-
pared to a scenario where renewable generation was not expanded)."14 In our model
we have analyzed the basic parameters that should be considered to determine the
capacity of intermittent and non-intermittent production plants anticipating their
efficient dispatch. Nevertheless these first-best decisions are not implementable be-
cause they necessitate prices varying with the state of nature and consumers reacting
accordingly. We also have shown that second best constrained by fixed delivery is
not financially feasible. The conclusion is that an electricity industry with a large
14Northern Ireland Assembly (2009).
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share of intermittent sources is not sustainable without an obligation of integration
in production, either structural or financial. An alternative solution that we did not
consider is random supply, but we can be sure that it is not politically sustainable.
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A First best production and capacity
The Lagrange function corresponding to problem (P1) in the text is15
L = ν £S(Ki + qwf )− cqwf + ξwf qwf + ηwf (Kf − qwf ) + ξiKi¤
+(1− ν) [S(Kf)− cKf ]− rfKf − riKi
Given the linearity of technologies and the concavity of the surplus function, the
following first order conditions are sufficient to determine the first best allocation:
∂L
∂qwf
= ν
£
S0(Ki + qwf )− c+ ξwf − ηwf
¤
= 0 (A1)
∂L
∂Kf
= νηwf + (1− ν) [S0(Kf)− c]− rf = 0 (A2)
∂L
∂Ki
= ν
£
S0(Ki + qwf ) + ξi
¤
− ri = 0 (A3)
plus the complementary slackness conditions derived from the three constraint of
(P1).
We first identify conditions for Ki > 0.
>From (A3), if Ki > 0, S0(Ki + qwf ) =
ri
ν and we can write from (A1)
ri
ν − c =
ηwf − ξwf . Then, we face two possibilities:
- if riν > c, η
w
f > 0 so that q
w
f = Kf > 0 and ξ
w
f = 0.
15ξwf ≥ 0, ηwf ≥ 0 and ξi ≥ 0 are the multipliers respectively associated to qwf ≥ 0, qwf ≤ Kf and
Ki ≥ 0.
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Plugging ηwf = S
0(Ki +Kf)− c into (A2) we obtain
νS0(Ki +Kf) + (1− ν)S0(Kf) = c+ rf
>From Ki > 0 and S00 < 0 , we have S0(Ki +Kf) < S0(Kf) so that
S0(Ki +Kf) =
ri
ν
< c+ rf
- in the second possibility, riν < c, the condition
ri
ν < c+ rf is obviously satisfied.
We conclude that riν > c+ rf is sufficient for Ki = 0.
We can therefore partition the set of parameters as follows:
a) for riν > c+ rf , Ki = 0. As regards the output of the reliable technology in state
of nature w, we have qwf = Kf . Indeed, assume q
w
f < Kf . Then η
w
f = 0 and
from (A1) S0(qwf ) − c = −ξwf ≤ 0. Similarly from (A2) S0(Kf) − c =
rf
1−ν > 0.
But since S00 < 0 these two inequalities are not compatible. It results that
qwf = q
w
f = Kf and combining (A1) and (A2) , S
0(Kf) = c+ rf .
b) for c > riν , since from (A1)
ri
ν − c = ηwf − ξ
w
f , we have ξ
w
f > 0 so that qwf = 0.
Knowing that Kf > 0, this implies ηwf = 0. Then, from (A2) we have
S0(Kf) = c+
rf
1− ν
and from (A3) and Ki > 0
S0(Ki) =
ri
ν
.
c) for the intermediary case c + rf > riν > c, we saw formerly that Ki > 0 and
qwf = Kf . From equation (A3).
S0(Ki +Kf) =
ri
ν
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and combining (A1) and (A2)
νS0(Ki +Kf) + (1− ν)S0(Kf) = c+ rf
Plugging the first equation into the second,
S0(Kf) =
c+ rf − ri
1− ν .
B Second best under uniform provision of electric-
ity
Adding the constraint Ki + qwf = Kf and the multiplier γ to the Lagrange function
of first best, the first order conditions become
∂L
∂qwf
= ν[S0(Ki + qwf )− c+ ξwf − ηwf + γ] = 0 (B1)
∂L
∂Kf
= ν(ηwf − γ) + (1− ν) [S0(Kf)− c]− rf = 0 (B2)
∂L
∂Ki
= ν
£
S0(Ki + qwf ) + ξi + γ
¤
− ri = 0 (B3)
We already know that Ki = 0 when riν > c + rf . We then focus on
ri
ν < c + rf .
Combining (B1) and (B3) we have that
ri
ν
− c = ηwf + ξi − ξwf
• If riν < c , ξwf > 0 so that qwf = 0 and Ki = Kf . Because Kf > qwf = 0 , ηwf = 0
and ξi = 0. Consequently we can combine (B2) and (B3) to get
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S0(Ki = Kf) = (1− ν)c+ rf + ri.
• If riν > c , ηwf > 0 so that qwf = Kf and ξi > 0 so that Ki = 0. In effect, we
cannot have Ki > 0 because, if so, ξi = 0 and ηwf > 0 so that q
w
f = Kf . The
uniform delivery constraint becomes Ki +Kf = Kf which cannot be true for
Ki > 0. Then, second best commands S0(Kf) = c+ rf like for riν > c+ rf.
C Two sources of intermittent energy
In our modelling, there is a one-to-one relationship between states of nature and the
technology using the energy available in this state of nature. This allows to simplify
notations by dropping the index naming states of nature s. Using the same notation
as before for the multipliers, the first-order conditions yield:
∂L
∂qif
= νi
£
S0(Ki + qif)− c+ ξif − ηif
¤
= 0 for i = 1, 2
∂L
∂q12f
= ν12
£
S0(K1 +K2 + q12f )− c+ ξ12f − η12f
¤
= 0
∂L
∂Kf
= (1− ν) [S0(Kf)− c] + ν1η1f + ν2η2f + ν12η12f − rf = 0
∂L
∂Ki
= νi
£
S0(Ki + qif) + ξi
¤
+ ν12
£
S0(K1 +K2 + q12f ) + ξi
¤
− ri = 0 for i = 1, 2
plus the complementary slackness conditions derived from the constraints of (P2).
Since in states of nature with intermittent energy, one can always use the fossil fuel
equipment, production cannot be lower: K1 +K2 + q
f
12 ≥ Ki + qfi ≥ Kf for i = 1, 2.
Since S0 is decreasing, these inequalities imply S0(K1 + K2 + q
f
12) ≤ S0(Ki + qfi ) ≤
S0(Kf) for i = 1, 2.
Proof of a). We show that Ki = 0 if and only if c + rf < riνi + ν12 for i = 1, 2.
Suppose that c+ rf < riνi + ν12 for i = 1, 2. By (C5− 6),
ri
νi + ν12
=
νiS0(Ki + q
f
i ) + ν12S
0(K1 +K2 + q12f
νi + ν12
+ ξi (1)
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Moreover, by (C4),
c+ rf = (1− ν)S0(Kf) + νc+ ν1η1f + ν2η2f + ν12η12f
Using (C1− 3), we substitute for ηjf (j = 1, 2, 12) to obtain:
c+ rf = E[S0(Ki + q
f
i )] + ν1ξ
1
f + ν2ξ
2
f + ν12ξ
12
f (2)
where E[S0(Ki+ q
f
i )] ≡ ν1S0(K1+ q
f
1 ) + ν2S0(K2+ q
f
2 ) + ν12S0(K1+K2+ q12f )+ (1−
ν)S0(Kf) is the expected marginal surplus. The assumption c + rf < riνi + ν12 for
i = 1, 2 combined with (2), (1) and the non-negativity of ξjf for j = 1, 2, 12 leads to
E[S0(Ki + q
f
i )] <
νiS0(Ki + q
f
i ) + ν12S
0(K1 +K2 + q12f )
νi + ν12
+ ξi, (3)
for i = 1, 2. Suppose first that K1 + q
f
1 ≤ K2 + qf2 then S0(K1 + K2 + qf12) ≤
S0(K2 + q
f
2 ) ≤ S0(K1 + qf1 ) ≤ S0(Kf) which implies:
E[S0(Ki + q
f
i )] ≥
ν2S0(K2 + q
f
2 ) + ν12S
0(K1 +K2 + q12f )
ν2 + ν12
,
for i = 1, 2. For the last inequality to be consistent with (3) for i = 2, it must be that
ξ2 > 0 which implies K2 = 0. Since by assumption K1 + q
f
1 ≤ K2 + qf2 = qf2 = Kf
and then we must have K1 = 0 and q
f
1 = Kf .
Suppose now that Ki = 0 for i = 1, 2 then ξi > 0 for i = 1, 2 in (C5-6) which
leads to
(νi + ν12)S0(Kf) < ri (4)
for i = 1, 2. Moreover by (C1-3), ηjf = S
0(Kf)−c for j = 1, 2, 12 which combined with
(C4) leads to S0(Kf) = c+rf . The last equality joint with (4) leads to c+rf < riνi + ν12
for i = 1, 2.
Proof of b.1). Suppose ν1 = ν2 = 0, ν12 > 0 and c + rf > riν12 for i = 1, 2. The
first-order conditions simplify to:
S0(K1 +K2 + q12f ) = c− ξ12f + η12f (C’3)
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(1− ν) [S0(Kf)− c] = rf − ν12η12f (C’4)
S0(K1 +K2 + q12f ) =
ri
ν12
− ξi for i = 1, 2 (C’5-6)
Conditions (C’5-6) lead to ξ2−ξ1 = r2ν12 −
r1
ν12 > 0 where the last inequality is due
to the assumption r2 > r1. Therefore ξ2 > 0 which implies K2 = 0. Since there are
only two states of nature with only one source of intermittent energy in one state like
in Section 2, Proposition 1 holds. In particular, with our notation we have K1 > 0
for c+ rf > r1ν12 .
Proof of b.2). Suppose that ν1 > 0, ν2 > 0 and ν12 = 0 and c + rf > riνi for
i = 1, 2. The first-order conditions simplify to:
S0(Ki + qif) = c− ξif + ηif for i = 1, 2 (C”1-2)
(1− ν) [S0(Kf)− c] = rf − ν1η1f − ν2η2f (C”4)
S0(Ki + qif) =
ri
νi
− ξi for i = 1, 2 (C”5-6)
Case 1: riνi < c for one i ∈ {1, 2}. The conditions (C”1-2) and (C”5-6) imply
c − riνi = ξ
i
f − ηif − ξi > 0 which implies ξif > 0 and therefore qif = 0, i.e. no fossil
power in state i. As long as νi > 0 and S0(0) = +∞, qif = 0 is optimal only if Ki > 0.
Case 2: riνi > c for i = 1, 2. Suppose first that K1 = K2 = 0. Then Ki+ q
f
i = Kf for
i = 1, 2, 12 (use of fossil power under full capacity in all states of nature). Moreover,
Ki = 0 implies ξi > 0 and therefore S0(Kf) <
ri
νi by (C”5-6). The first-order
conditions (C”1-2) and (C”4) imply S0(Kf) = c + rf which combined with the last
inequality contradicts the assumption c + rf > riνi . Suppose now that K1 > 0 and
K2 = 0 which implies K2 + q
f
2 = Kf and ξ2 > 0. The first-order conditions (C”4)
and (C”5-6) imply respectively (1 − ν1) [S0(Kf)− c] = rf − ν1η1f and S0(Kf) < r2ν2 .
The two last relations lead to ν1η1f > rf + c− r2ν2 + ν1
h
r2
ν2 − c
i
. Since by assumption
rf + c > r2ν2 > c, η
1
f > 0 and therefore q
f
1 = Kf . The first-order conditions imply
E[S0(Ki + q
f
i )] = rf + c. Since S
0(K1 + Kf) < E[S0(Ki + q
f
i )] < S
0(Kf), the last
equality combined with S0(Kf) < r2ν2 contradicts our starting assumption c+rf >
r2
ν2 .
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